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RELATIVE ROLES OF STATES/ PROVINCES IN
REGULATING AGRICULTURE AND THE RESULTING
IMPACT ON CROSS-BORDER TRADE
Kevin J. Brosch*
The topic that we have been asked to discuss today is whether trade in
agricultural goods under the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) could be undermined by state or provincial actions that interfered
with trade, that condoned interference with trade, or that subsidized exporters
or producers. Because I have no expertise in, and only very limited
experience with, Canadian law, I will limit my remarks to the situation in the
United States.
Let me begin with an assessment of the extent of the problems that we
have experienced thus far with state attempts to interfere with U.S.-Canada
trade in agricultural products. As far as I am aware, there have only been
three incidents of any significance over the past thirty years.
In 1970, the State of Maine attempted to apply its own state marketing
and grading regulations to imports of potatoes from Canada. The federal
government quickly stepped in and asserted federal preemption on the basis
of the authority granted under the Agricultural Marketing Act and the state
relented. In 1984, South Dakota banned imported pork from Canada because
of alleged health concerns over an animal drug that was being used in some
Canadian production. But, of course, South Dakota is not a significant
import market for Canadian pork and when other states failed to follow suit,
this effort dissipated. In 1998, the states of Montana, North Dakota and
South Dakota took some short-lived actions against imports of Canadian
grain and meat products. I will discuss this incident, which is the only
significant state disruption of U.S.-Canada agricultural trade since the
NAFTA came into force, in more detail later in this paper.
Three short-lived incidents in thirty years certainly do not constitute a
crisis. They represent occasional and politically nettlesome trade irritants,
but, in the larger view, not really significant problems. Although this issue
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of the potential impact of state action on NAFTA is interesting to discuss, I
fear, given the infrequent and ineffective attempts by states to block U.S.-
Canada agricultural trade, that simply by putting this topic on the agenda, we
may be blowing its significance way out of proportion.
The increased interest in this topic, of course, arises because NAFTA is
supposed to create a free trade area on this continent, and there is an
accompanying expectation that unwarranted interferences with liberal trade
will cease. The NAFTA has been in force for approximately eight years.
During that time, there has been a substantial amount of rhetoric from
various state politicians about the problems that NAFTA has created for their
various producer sectors. In spite of the rancor, we have experienced very
few attempts by states to interfere with trilateral trade in agricultural
products.
There have been five highly visible situations in which trade blockage in
agricultural products has been threatened, but in only two of those cases has
there been any real state action to interfere with trade. Two noted trade
problems often discussed are those that involved imports into the United
States of avocados from Mexico and of potatoes from Eastern Canada.
While politicians respectively in California and New England have been very
vocal in their opinions that imports should be restricted, in fact the
regulations at issue are not state actions but restrictions that have been
imposed by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service (APHIS) under the federal regulatory regime. Despite
occasional threats that states will take some action, that has not yet occurred
and, in my view, are unlikely to happen; or if they do, are unlikely to have
any real commercial impact. Another issue with high visibility has been
imports of softwood lumber from Canada, but that case involves the issues of
alleged subsidies and the proper application of federal import relief laws, i.e.,
the U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty laws.
The only situations truly relevant to the discussion today are two actions
that were taken in the early autumn of 1998. One was an action by the
governors of various Northern Plains states to block shipments of Canadian
livestock and grain; and the other actions by the State of Florida involving
imports of Mexican tomatoes and winter vegetables.
In the case of Canadian imports, the problem began with a four-hour
blockade by farmers and ranchers of the border-crossing point at Sweetgrass,
Montana. The farmers and ranchers had been experiencing declining
2
Canada-United States Law Journal, Vol. 27 [2001], Iss. , Art. 21
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol27/iss/21
Brosch- ROLES OF STATES/PROVINCES INREGULATINGAGRICULTURE
commodity prices and blamed their problems on imports of Canadian goods.
Responding to this populist sentiment, state officials in North and South
Dakota announced that those states would begin pulling over Canadian
trucks carrying agricultural goods - cattle, hogs and grain - under what was
termed "tougher inspection programs." It was not clear what precisely the
states would be looking for in those inspections, or what risk they were
asserting needed to be protected against. North Dakota and Montana did
institute increased stops and inspections; the Governor of South Dakota
ordered that the state highway patrol turn away trucks attempting to cross
into that state.
While these actions may appear to be irrational, they were in fact quite
calculated. The farmers' action and the governors' response occurred
roughly six weeks before a very important mid-term congressional election
in the United States. All of the governors of the states involved were
Republicans; the sitting federal administration was Democrat.
Canada immediately requested consultations under both the WTO and the
NAFTA. Shippers and trucking interests, disappointed with the lack of an
immediate federal legal response, threatened to bring action in federal court.
Within a week, on September 29, USDA Secretary Dan Glickman met with
the governors of six Great Plains states and reached an agreement under
which he would seek bilateral consultations with Canada on an appropriate
list of state grievances in return for an agreement by the governors to end
state action against Canadian trucks. Through an exchange of letters
between USTR Charlene Barshefsky and Canadian Minister Sergio Marchi
on October 2, bilateral consultations were agreed and Canada suspended its
requests for WTO and NAFTA formal consultations, subject to the
conditions that all state actions against Canadian shipments cease. After this
agreement was reached, the state actions against Canadian shippers
effectively stopped.
The Clinton Administration subsequently asked the governors to submit a
list of grievances that it could pursue in these talks with Canada and
requested that the list be reasonable and focused. The list that it received
reflected various issues, but interestingly many had to do with lack of access
for U.S. producers to the Canadian market, or various perceived advantages
that Canadian producers allegedly enjoyed because of U.S. regulatory
actions. (For example, the states asserted that their farmers were unable to
use pesticides available to Canadian farmers because those pesticides had not
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yet been approved for use by U.S. regulatory agencies). The list contained
nothing that suggested a problem justifying inspection of Canadian trucks.
The subsequent consultations between the United States and Canada did
not turn out quite the way that some interests on this side of the border had
initially hoped. Naturally, Canada came to the table with its own set of
issues, a fairly long list of topics most of which the United States was not
interested in talking about. By December there had been several meetings
but discussions had focused mostly on developing a new process to improve
dialogue between the countries on agricultural trade issues of concern, and
on methods for ensuring greater state and provincial participation in that
process.
In late December, farmers in Montana announced that they were not
satisfied with discussions over "process" and threatened to renew their
blockade. However, the situation had changed in one important respect - the
election was over. State officials made very little noise and the commotion
subsided.
The episode in Florida began in almost the same way and at the same
time - a short time before the mid-term congressional election. The Florida
Commissioner of Agriculture announced that Florida would need to institute
additional state inspections of imports from Mexico to ensure that state
production of tomatoes and vegetables was not placed at risk by the
introduction of exotic diseases. Inspection of imported product for this
purpose, of course, is a function regularly performed by the federal
government, specifically by the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
(APHIS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. There had been no
indication that APHIS had been derelict in its duties, and there had been no
new or significant plant disease or pest problems.
Nonetheless, Florida suddenly called for additional state inspection at
Tampa and other major ports, and began to stop trucks carrying Mexican
produce as they crossed into Florida on the highways. Initially, Florida
officials indicated that they would conduct roadside phytosanitary
inspections of the trucks; however, it soon appeared that all that they were
doing was checking the truckers' documents to ensure that the produce was
accompanied by proper APHIS inspection documents. From a regulatory
perspective, it was not clear precisely what Florida was doing, or what it was
attempting to accomplish.
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The response by the Clinton Administration was very similar to its
response in the Canadian situation. Administration officials promised
Florida officials that they would immediately initiate consultations with
Mexico. Secretary Glickman promised to speak directly with his
counterpart, the Mexican agricultural minister. USDA offered to send
additional APHIS personnel to Florida to work with state inspection officials.
Within a few weeks, state interference with shipping had ceased. And then
the election came and went, and the issue disappeared.
It seems to me that there are several observations we can make, and
lessons that we can draw from these two episodes:
There have only been two incidents of state interference with shipments
of agricultural goods from a NAFTA partner, and both took place at the same
time, roughly six weeks before a congressional mid-term election.
1. In each case, the actions were taken by states whose governors were
members of the opposition party.
2. In each case, the state action was initially, although weakly, justified as
some form of necessary regulatory action that required increased inspections
to safeguard local agriculture.
3. In each case, the Federal Government diffused the situation, not by
hauling the state into court, but by promising to pursue grievances with the
NAFTA partner.
4. In each case, state officials grabbed the fig leaf offered and withdrew
from the field as soon as the elections were over.
5. In each case, there have been no repeated incidents since that time.
The question that has been posed is whether states can be prevented from
unfairly interfering with NAFTA trade. The answer, as a legal matter is yes,
and I will come to that in a moment. However, as this recounting of past
events suggest, there is always the possibility that farmer unhappiness with
NAFTA trade will elicit a knee-jerk political response under certain
circumstances. We could have periodic reoccurrences of the types of
incidents that we saw in 1998, but it is likely that they will be episodic and
short-lived.
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Since the Great Depression, federal regulation has dominated the U.S.
agricultural landscape and is like to continue to dominate for many years to
come. The federal government operates all of the major crop support and
subsidy programs, most agricultural marketing programs, and a nearly
comprehensive system of animal and plant quarantine and meat inspection.
In these arenas, the federal regulatory schemes clearly preempt the field.
There are no comparable state schemes of any real importance.
If a state were to step in and interfere with one of these regulatory
schemes, could the federal government assert legal preemption to end this
interference? In almost all cases, the answer is probably yes. And in an
earlier era, where political issues of state-federal comity were not so acute,
the federal government was more willing to threaten to flex -- or in some
instances even to flex -- its legal muscle. The case cited earlier of Maine
attempting to interfere with imports of Canadian potatoes in the 1970's is a
good example.
Today, the federal government is much less willing, as a political matter,
to haul a state into court. This is especially so in an election year. So the
strategy is different. The federal government waits for the political moment
to pass and for the incident to peter on its own. And, experience tells us, this
is probably a wise decision. State official drawn suddenly to a political
response have to commit limited state resources to enforce ill-conceived and
often undeliverable schemes, all with the understanding that, should the
federal patience wear thin, they would almost certainly lose a court battle.
State officials who may perceive a short-term political advantage initially in
taking actions against imported products, quickly see that there is also
political reality in retiring from the field at the first convenient moment.
Are state subsidies to agriculture a potential threat to NAFTA? Not
really. Nothing in our law prevents states from subsidizing their producers.
In fact, there are a few small state subsidy programs - some water subsidies
and some assistance to dairy producers. But the fight over subsidies occurs
in Washington. Simply put, states simply do not have the revenues to play in
this game. States have not been major players in the subsidy game up to
now, and there is no reason to thing that will change.
There are other problems with subsidies - e.g., they are countervailable.
This is one of the things that American agriculture is quickly learning. The
more that governments - federal or state -subsidize producers or interfere in
the operation of the markets, the more U.S. exports are the target of trade
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relief actions in other countries. There was a time during which almost all
countervailing duty or antidumping actions took place in U.S. courts and
administrative tribunals. Nowadays, trade relief actions are commonplace in
many parts of the developing world where the U.S. attempts to sell its
agricultural products.
Finally, is state-condoned or state-permitted private action to block trade
a threat to NAFTA? I don't think so. Trade blockage along the border is
difficult to sustain. There is a wide and open border between the United
States and Canada, and blocking a single border crossing can have only
limited and short-term effect. Farmers and ranchers really don't like to spend
their time away from their businesses blocking a road. What they want to do
is to induce state action, to bring state officials into the fight, so that they can
go home. If state officials do not act, there really is no natural force to
sustain prolonged private action.
There are, of course, other reasons why private action to block trade is
unlikely. Everyone in the United States - and that includes farmers and
ranchers - are aware of the problem of potential tort liability. If a farmer is
out on a road blocking the highway with his tractor, he is taking some risk.
If he forgets this in the heat of the moment, his wife will quickly remind him
when he gets home: "If someone gets into a traffic accident because you are
blocking the road with your tractor, we're going to get sued." No farmer
wants to lose his farm to a tort lawyer from Minneapolis or Chicago.
Because this is a legal conference, I should conclude my talk by turning
from these largely political discussions to analysis of a real legal issue. I
mentioned earlier that the federal government could, but is often reluctant for
political reasons, to take a state official to court when that official takes an
unjustified action to block trade. The question is whether, if the federal
government is unwilling to litigate with the state, a private litigant could
bring an effective challenge? I bring this up because I recently read a law
review article' in which the author argued that the NAFTA implementing
statute, and specifically section 102(b), establishes that only the federal
government may challenge state actions that interfere with NAFTA trade;
and that, where the federal government was reluctant to sue a state, private
actions attempting to pursue a NAFTA violation would be unavailing.
I Samuel C. Straight, Note, GATE and NAFTA: Marrying Effective Dispute Settlement
and the Sovereignth of the Fifty States, 45 DUKE L.J. 216, *249 (October 1995).
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I do not agree with this conclusion, and I would like to explain why.
Section 102(b) provides:
No state law or application thereof may be declared invalid as to any person
or circumstances on the ground that the provision or application is
inconsistent with the agreement [i.e., the NAFTA], except in an action
brought by the United States for the purpose of declaring such law or
application invalid.2
I would respectfully suggest that the key phrase in this statute is
"inconsistent with this agreement."
The NAFTA and other recent trade agreements - e.g., the WTO
Agreements resulting from the Uruguay Round negotiations - are not
"treaties" in the Constitutional sense. They are what are termed
"congressional-executive agreements." Although the U.S. executive goes out
and negotiates these arrangements with foreign governments, the final
agreements reached are not submitted to the Senate for ratification. As a
result, the agreement itself (often loosely referred to as a trade "treaty") never
becomes part of U.S. law. Instead, the Administration returns from the
negotiation and drafts "implementing legislation." That legislation alters
existing domestic law in whatever manner is necessary to allow the United
States to meet the trade obligations it has undertaken. However, the trade
agreement itself never becomes a part of U.S. law.
Assume for a moment that a state official took an action such as the ones
I described earlier in the 1998 South Dakota and Florida examples, and that a
private party found itself aggrieved by that action. I suggest that section 102
would not effectively prevent that private party from bringing a lawsuit or
from prevailing if the facts so merited. I would submit that the alert private
litigant with an intelligent lawyer would bring the lawsuit without ever
alleging that the state action was "inconsistent with NAFTA." Indeed, the
smart litigant would never mention NAFTA at all.
Let us take the example of Florida where state officials blocked trade in
Mexican produce on the grounds that they need to "inspect" trucks for some
unspecified health purposes. Long before anyone ever even thought of
NAFTA, Congress had passed a series of laws creating a nearly
comprehensive scheme of federal regulation to prevent the movement of
2North American Free Trade Agreement, Section 102. U.S.-Canada-Mexico, Dec. 17,
1992, 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993).
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animal or plant diseases. APHIS had authority to regulate both imports and
interstate commerce under the Quarantine Act, the Plant Pest Act, the Virus-
Serum-Toxin Act and other statutes. The Food Safety Inspection Service has
authority to regulate the movement of meat, poultry and egg products.
Whenever states have attempted to impose additional, inconsistent
restrictions that interfere with these federal regulatory schemes, the courts
have held the federal scheme preemptive.
The courts have also ruled that private litigants may assert federal
preemption in these areas to invalidate inconsistent state action. You do not
need to be the federal government to bring such a case. For example, in the
recent Symens v. SmithKlein Beecham case,3 private defendants successfully
invoked the federal preemptive effect of APIS' regulatory scheme under
the Virus-Serum-Toxin Act to defeat inconsistent state law-based tort and
warranty claims.
Is this not a more straightforward way of dealing with questionable state
actions like the unnecessary and harassing inspection of trucks? Why bother
to assert that such action is "inconsistent with NAFTA?" Why mention
NAFTA at all? Why not simply assert, as the Symens defendants did, that
this action is inconsistent with a preemptive federal regulatory scheme - in
this case, APHIS's system of quarantine and inspection.
Despite what section 102(b) appears to suggest, NAFTA itself is
irrelevant when situations like those that occurred in South Dakota or Florida
present themselves. NAFTA is not a treaty, was never ratified, is not, in
itself, U.S. domestic law. The NAFT7A is not implemented under our law as
a treaty; it is implemented by modifying or amending existing law. It seems
to me that the wise litigant - and his wise lawyer - would frame his action on
the grounds of federal preemption and would avoid altogether arguing about
"inconsistency" with NAFrA.
In summary: the question that was posed was whether state action, state
subsidies, or state-condoned private action are significant threats to NAFTA.
As a legal matter, the answer is no. As a political matter, state action may
periodically appear as an irritant, but is unlikely to be sustained for long.
3 Symens v. SmithKlein Beecham, 152 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 1998).
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